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ILLINOIS REJECTS A NEW CONSTITUTION
By WALTER F. DODD*
HE constitutional convention which assembled in Illinois on
January 6, 1920, held a number of sessions running until September 12, 1922. On September 12 a proposed constitution was
finally agreed upon for submission to the people on December
12, 1922. The chief reasons for calling a constitutional convention were (a) to modernize the tax system of the state; (b) to
obtain a better and more simplified judicial organization; (c) to
produce a short ballot, so that the voter would be able better to
perform his duties; and (d) to provide an easier method for
future amendments to the constitution, so that changes in the
fundamental law of the state could be made when desired by
the deliberate sentiment of the people.
The issue of Cook County representation became a serious
one immediately upon the meeting of the convention; and this
issue was largely responsible for numerous sessions and recesses.
Under the constitution of 1870 all parts of the state are to be
equally represented in proportion to their population. However,
no reapportionment has taken place in Illinois since 1901, and
Cook County though now having about forty-seven percent of the
population has grown more rapidly than the remainder of the state
and still has but thirty-seven percent of the representation in the
two houses of the general assembly. The failure to reapportion
the state as required by the constitution after each decennial cen-
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sus has been due to a developing fear upon the part of the rest
of the state that Cook County will dominate both houses of the
general assembly, and that a union of Cook County members may
control the policy of state legislation with respect not only to
Cook County but with respect to the remainder of the state as
well. Many of the delegates to the Illinois constitutional convention from outside of Cook County felt for this reason that it would
be necessary to limit Cook County representation permanently
in both houses of the general assembly. Until it was possible
to agree upon a compromise the other work of the convention
was for a long time at a standstill.
The compromise finally agreed upon by the convention limited
Cook County permanently to one-third of the members of the
state senate; and provided that all parts of the state should be
equally represented in the house of representatives upon the basis
of voting strength rather than of population. The adoption
of voting strength (the vote for governor being taken as a
basis) would have reduced the representation of Cook County
and of all other large industrial communities of the state, as
well as certain mining communities, because of greater alien population in these parts of the state. Aliens of course count in the
total population of the several counties, but a large proportion of
aliens who cannot vote would reduce the representation of these
areas. Cook County, for example, although entitled to fortyseven percent of the representation upon the basis of population,
would upon voting strength have been entitled to between fortyone and forty-two percent.
The framers of the proposed constitution also provided that
in a future constitutional convention the representation of Cook
County should be forty-five out of one hundred twenty-one members, approximately thirty-seven percent. This was the proportion in which Cook County was represented in the constitutional
convention of 1920-22, and would have been a permanent limitation. Under it Cook County would in a future convention for
the revision of the constitution, have had thirty-seven percent
of the total membership even though the population of this
county may have advanced to perhaps sixty percent of the population of the state as a whole.
To some extent related to the issue of representation, was
that as to the membership of the supreme court. The supreme
court is composed of seven members, one chosen from each of
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seven supreme court districts. The theory of the constitution
of 1870 was that these districts should be substantially equal in
population, but under the census of 1920 the seventh district
(having one member of the supreme court) contained fifty-one
percent of the population of the state. The constitutional convention provided that the membership of the supreme court should
be increased to nine and that three of these nine should be elected
from the seventh district, but provided further that not more than
two of the three members from this district should at the time
of their election be residents of the same county.
Until a compromise was reached upon the issues of representation, it was difficult for the convention to reach an agreement
upon other matters. Upon the larger issues which occasioned
its assembling, the work of the convention was not fully satisfactory.
Next to representation, the issue of taxation was the most
important and took the greatest amount of time. Illinois still
relies for state and local revenue primarily upon the general
property tax. Under this tax, intangible personalty largely
escapes taxation, tangible personalty escapes to a large extent, and
the methods of valuing real property are unsatisfactory.
Many interests in the state were, however, opposed to the abolition of the general property tax, and felt that to abolish this tax
would increase the burdens upon land. The plan finally agreed
upon by the convention permitted the substitution of an income
tax upon the income of intangibles for the taxation of such
property on the basis of value. The proposed constitution also
permitted, in addition to other taxes, the imposition of a general
income tax upon all net incomes, and provided by its own terms
for the exemption which might be made and for rates of progression, should the general assembly provide for this additional
income tax.
With respect to judicial organization the work of the convention was more satisfactory than elsewhere. The proposed
constitution would have permitted the consolidation of the courts
of Cook County, the simplification to some extent of the organization of courts in other parts of the state, and would have
given the supreme court power to make rules of pleading, practice
and procedure. Although the theory of judicial rule-making
power is a wise one, the proposed constitution was defective in
that it sought to give the supreme court exclusive rule-making

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

power, without an effective check upon such power in the legislative department. In effect it would have set up two legislative
departments for the state, with power over different aspects of the
same matter, and would probably have led to serious difficulties.
It is impossible to separate rules of procedure from the rules of
substantive law, and to give one department of government exclusive authority over the one field, and another department exclusive authority over the other.
Under the existing constitution of Illinois cities have no homerule powers. The proposed constitution would have given Chicago authority to frame its own form of government; and power, without the necessity for legislative action, to deal with certain of its purely local problems.
The necessity for a constitutional convention was largely
occasioned by the difficulty of amending the constitution of 1870
through legislative proposal. But the framers of the proposed
constitution were unwilling to propose an amending method much
if any easier than that already in force.
There are styles in constitutions as in other human institutions. The, recent constitutional convention in Illinois was a
highly conservative group, more likely to follow the styles of the
past generation than of the present. The initiative and referendum are present styles in constitution-making, but they found
almost no support in this convention. Arguments in favor of the
short ballot found little favor with the convention or in its proposals. In certain respects, however, present tendencies were
influential. Something of municipal home rule was proposed
for Chicago. Provisions for a more unified judicial system were
agreed to, and the proposal to confer rule-making power upon
the courts was approved. Unfortunately it is still the fashion to
have detailed constitutions, and the proposal of the Illinois constitutional convention was in line with this policy; although as
in other states there were some proposals leading toward increased power in the legislature. The amending process of the
present constitution of Illinois belongs to the period of the Civil
War, but the conservative group in the recent Illinois convention
were opposed to anything that would materially if at all alter
this situation.
When submitted on December 12, 1922, the proposed constitution was rejected by a majority of more than 700,000. No
part of the state favored the new document. The popular major-
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ity was against it in seventy-six of the one hundred and two
counties. In Cook County it received the vote of only about
one voter in seventeen.
The convention submitted its work as a single document, thus
of necessity uniting all the forces opposed to any single change.
It was urged to submit all important and controversial issues
separately, as was done in 1870, but declined to adopt this policy.
Had this been done, the people would probably have adopted a
number of the proposed changes.
Another important factor in defeating the proposed constitution was the fact that in form it appeared to be an entirely new
document. Where a state has been long in existence, a new constitution is in most of its provisions new only in name. This
was true of the proposed constitution of 1922. Both the delegates
to the convention and the people were satisfied with most of the
provisions of the constitution of 1870 and did not desire to
change them. But the convention decided that it could express
many of these provisions in better form, and that they should be
re-written. Were a constitution a mere literary composition,
this decision would not have been dangerous. But a constitution is
a legal document whose language had in large part been construed
by the supreme court. To change it involved the danger of changing its meaning, unless the changes were made with great care;
and 'great care was not exercised. Many voters for this reason
rightly felt that adopting the proposed constitution was to embark upon an uncertain experiment. Not having the facilities
for an intelligent judgment regarding each change, they suspected
that in some cases concealed meanings had been introduced.
The chief factors in producing an overwhelming adverse vote
may perhaps be summed up as: (1) taxation; (2) representation; (3) the fact that the voter must support or oppose as a
whole, and (4) distrust (in many specific cases without basis but
in others warranted) of a document whose language had been
changed, even though admittedly no change of sense was intended.
The election upon the proposed constitution presents an interesting illustration of the operation of popular government.
Inasmuch as the proposed constitution was submitted as a single
document, the issues were too detailed and to complex to be
understood by the voter. No one could understand all of the
points presented without carefully analyzing every section of the
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proposed constitution in relation to the constitution of 1870 and
in view of the judicial decisions construing that constitution.
The voters naturally and necessarily lined up in various groups,
and this grouping was determined not so much by the merits of the
case, as by the prestige of individual leaders and by party or other
affiliations. There was some grouping also because of distrust
of specific provisions of the proposed constitution.
The line of opposition to the proposed constitution was one
of a type not often presented in an election. The organization
of the democratic party was largely opposed because of the feeling that under the proposed constitution issues of apportionment
and of supreme and appellate court membership would largely
be determined by the dominant republican organization. The
Small-Thompson factional organization in the' republican party
was opposed, apparently for political reasons, though ostensibly
on matters of principle. The labor and radical groups were
strongly opposed. The labor organizations opposed partly because
of the feeling that increased power in the courts was in opposition to the interests of labor, and partly also because the conventions defeated the effort of labor organizations to have the
terms of the constitution at least give some recognition to labor
as a factor in the state. It may be interesting to remark that
the colored voters of Chicago were more influential with the
convention than were the labor forces. The colored influences
obtained an express provision in the proposed constitution prohibiting discriminations on account of race or color. The labor
forces found it impossible to obtain even a relatively meaningless
provision with respect to themselves.
The teachers and various groups of other state and local employees opposed the proposed constitution on the ground that it
would interfere with present laws with respect to employees'
pensions. The fears in this respect were probably groundless,
but had a large influence in bringing about the great majority
against the proposed constitution.
The manufacturers and various other groups in the state opposed the proposed constitution on the ground that it was likely
to increase the burdens of taxation. The same influence probably
affected the professional groups and many people on fixed salaries.
The issue of Cook County representation was largely responsible for the tremendous vote against the proposed constitution in Cook County and the city of Chicago; though the tax
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issue was also prominent, and the teachers and other governmental employees were highly influential.
It is perhaps more difficult to analyze the forces in favor of
the proposed constitution, and less necessary because such forces
were the less numerous. Some down-state support for the proposed constitution was obtained on the ground that it restricted
the powers of Chicago and Cook County in the state legislature.
This issue was expected by the supporters of the constitution to
play a large and controlling part, but apparently did not do so
in any part of the state. It was expected also that the farmers
would be influenced in favor of the proposed constitution by the
argument that the proposed document would make it more readily
possible to tax intangible property, and would thus reduce the
tax burden upon the farmers. However, it was urged on the other
side that the farmers might be subjected to an income tax in
addition to their property taxes, and the farmer vote was not
decisively with the proposed constitution. The State Bankers'
Association supported the proposed constitution as did also a
referendum of the Chicago Bar Association.
Some civic organizations in Chicago were strongly in support
of the proposed constitution. This support was based primarily
on two grounds. The proposed constitution would have abolished
the cumulative system for the election of the house of representatives. Some of these bodies regarded this as a sufficiently
great gain to justify support. The proposed constitution would
have given Chicago power to frame its own charter, and wider
powers with respect to matters of a purely local concern. This
was regarded by some as a highly desirable gain, and as compensating for the many serious defects of the proposed constitution.
The majority against the proposed constitution was united
only in opposition, and not in the reasons for such opposition.
In this case, as in most complex issues submitted to popular approval, the majority was but the combination of a series of more
or less diverse minorities. The minority was also composed of
diverse elements. There is no such thing as unified mass opinion
controlling the settlement of complex governmental problems.
The election upon the proposed constitution did not and could
not turn on one issue alone. The mass decision of such a complex issue was of necessity more or less unintelligent. Few
voters had the opportunity or possibility of deciding either for or
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against the proposed constitution with reference to its merits as
a whole. As in all other cases of such a character, the issue was
settled by reasoned support of or opposition to the document as a
whole, coupled with opposition or support because of specific
reasons. And the great mass of voters, as usual, acted upon the
basis of the old rule of "follow your leaders."
The assembling of the Illinois constitutional convention of
1920-22 will not have been in vain. The constitution of Illinois
needs change as badly now as it did before; and the defeat of
the proposed constitution was not an expression of satisfaction
with things as they are. It may be remembered that a proposed
constitution was rejected in this state in 1862, but a new constitution adopted in 1870. It is not likely, however, that another
constitutional convention will be called in the near future. Effort
will now be centered upon the attempt to obtain an easier method
of amending the present constitution through legislative proposals.
The experience of Illinois raises an issue as to whether the
constitutional convention is now as useful as in earlier days.
Certainly there has been a tendency in recent years for conventions to submit their work as separate propositions, rather than
to propose complete constitutional revisions. Illinois is for some
years at least now forced back upon the individual amending
process through legislative proposal. Unfortunately this process
is in Illinois so hedged about that the amendment of the constitution is substantially impossible. Little enthusiasm can ordinarily
be developed behind the proposal to change an amending process;
for people are normally more interested in specific proposals than
in the machinery by which later reform may be accomplished.
However, a consistent effort will now be made in Illinois to amend
the amending clause in such a manner that the more needed
constitutional changes may be obtained through legislative proposal.
The Minnesota constitution is not so difficult to amend as that
of Illinois, though the required popular vote does make serious
difficulty. The Minnesota constitution is older than that of Illinois, and if numerous changes are desired it may be that a constitutional convention would be a useful instrument for governmental progress. If an amending system were relatively easy,
the Illinois experience may well point to the desirability of using
that machinery, unless such a complete overhauling of a con-
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stitutional document is desired as to make the use of the amending
process difficult and perhaps useless.
Certain local factors contributed to the failure of the recent
Illinois convention. This body did not develop effective leadership, and popular respect was weakened because of its numerous
sessions and recesses, covering a period of more than two years
and a half. The most serious difficulty, that occasioned by the
presence of one county containing nearly half of the state's
population, fortunately does not present itself in many other
states.
Leaving aside matters personal to the membership of the
Illinois convention, and those peculiar to conditions in Illinois,
it may be wise to suggest that conventions in other states will
profit by avoiding certain serious blunders in the methods of
the Illinois convention. The first of these serious blunders
was that of attempting to rephrase all of the provisions of the
constitution. Clear and satisfactory English is as important in
a constitution as elsewhere; but when constitutional language
is satisfactory and has been construed by the courts for a number
of years, it is best to leave well enough alone. It is best to do
this for two reasons: (1) Any effort to tinker with such
language may lead to unforeseen results, however careful the
drafting may be done; (2) The rephrasing of constitutional provisions whose meaning -is not intended to be changed will almost
of necessity lead to a suspicion on the part of the voters that some
concealed design is being carried out through such change.
Drafting a constitution is not the mere preparation of a
literary composition. The constitution is an important legal
document, dealing with many technical matters. Nor can the
framers of a constitution ignore the past. If framing a constitution for a new state, they will use language which has already
been judicially construed in other states. If revising an existing
constitution, they will be dealing with language already judicially
construed in that state. To change language for the sake of
change (even though its literary flavor may be improved) is to
run the risk of overturning desired constructions, and sacrifices
the important for the unessential.
The Illinois convention did not devote sufficient attention to
the manner of presenting its proposal to the people. Beginning
with Michigan in 1908, the framers of constitutional changes have
in a number of instances adopted by official vote brief statemeits
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of the purpose of each proposed change. Such notes aid not only
in the popular presentation of a convention's work, but also in
the subsequent judicial construction of that work if approved.
An effort by the Illinois convention to explain each proposed
change wotild have led to the detection of many defects in the
proposed constitution before correction was too late. Not only
did the convention not seek to explain its work in detail, but
the official publications issued in support of the proposed constitution gave the impression of disingenuousness and concealment.
The recent Illinois experience also shows the danger of submitting as a single document the terms of a proposed constitution
containing numerous controversial issues. New York in 1915
substantially adopted this plan, and the work of the New York
convention met the same fate as that of the Illinois convention.
Illinois in 1870 submitted a proposed constitution, but at the same
time proposed for the separate vote of the people eight distinct
questions which seemed more or less controversial or doubtful in
character. This plan has the advantage of reducing the number
of separate issues to be voted upon. The Ohio constitutional convention of 1912, the Massachusetts convention of 1917-18, and
the Nebraska constitutional convention of 1920 all submitted their
work in the form of separate and distinct amendments to existing
constitutions. This plan involves the difficulty of submitting too
many separate issues, if the proposed amendments are numerous;
but has in recent years worked more satisfactorily than the plan
of submitting the work of a constitutional convention as a single
document.

